Tactically Outmaneuvered
A Leadership Crisis
Understanding the Maoists
Modernising Training
Using Air Power
Better Intelligence
A Comprehensive Strategy
Recommendations
There is an urgent need to build a comprehensive counter-Maoist strategy that involves the key Maoist-affected states and the federal government. This must have clear and common outcomes agreed upon with timelines for effective implementation. This means also building institutional mechanisms to share intelligence in a timely fashion, have joint operational capabilities of the police along their contiguous borders, while also working together at the political level.
The strategy to wean off the local population to be recruited as cadres for the Maoists has to be reworked regularly, looking at local factors such as tribal identities, their local resources, the ability of the local government to deliver development.
The Maoist-prone areas will need better lines of communications and better road networks. The ₹ 11,000 crore project meant to link 44 Maoist-affected districts through 5411 km roads has to be sped up considerably as most of it is in Chhattisgarh.
Leadership issues in forces meant for counter-insurgency operations at the federal and state level need to resolved. The focus should be on developing a younger age profile of the constabulary and the officer cadre, with special training to carry out small-team and deep penetration operations. There should be a well-laid out criteria for appointing leaders in operational roles of all security forces, be it the CRPF or the state police force. This must include experience and training of the officers under consideration before they are appointed to counter-insurgency roles.
The deputation of the IPS to Central Police Organisations should be aimed at commandant ranks to ensure they have experience in counter-insurgency operations at the company and battalion levels. Only officers who have served at the company and battalion levels should be posted to the higher echelons of the CRPF to ensure continuity and consistency in counter insurgency operations.
Training of the state and police forces have to be carried out to build small-team and deep penetration operations on the lines of the Greyhounds. Training also needs to be balanced with deployment schedules to ensure adequate time for rest and training to ensure the forces operating on the ground are at their peak performance. A clear chain of command should be apparent with even small-sized teams undertaking operations.
States with contiguous borders where Maoists operate need to improve their coordination and deployment of forces. The lack of coordination also leads to jurisdictional and operational issues that work to the advantage of the Maoists while limiting the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency forces.
The key to better counter insurgency operations will be the improvement in generating intelligence and optimum use of air power. The reluctance to use helicopter gunships and air back up for operations is leading to unnecessary loss of precious lives. Currently, these are major areas of concern.
States also need to establish common databases and carry out multi-disciplinary studies to counter Maoists. They need take a comprehensive look at socio-economic factors that lead to higher recruitment by the Maoists from the local populace. Once an area is secured, the development works cannot be allowed to languish at a tardy pace.
India needs a comprehensive doctrine that helps build institutional strategy and memory to combat armed insurgencies. Currently, forces deployed in counter-insurgency operations lack a common doctrine, methods and goals and tend to work at cross purpose. The development of comprehensive doctrine will enable all forces to build a minimum standard of expertise and performance, vastly reducing casualties and increasing their effectiveness against armed insurgent groups.
Rationalisation of forces to be used for combating Maoists is imperative. Though CRPF is the nodal agency, other CPOs are also used in the states for anti-Maoist campaigns. It would be in order to used only the CRPF which is specialized for this task.
The regimental ethos of the CRPF should be kept intact. The battalion cannot be dispersed in a manner where different companies are performing varied nature of assignment at different places far from each other.
Quarterly meeting of Home ministers and DGPs of affected states along with the key CRPF Officers is a must for stock taking, future planning and ironing out the differences/gaps in operations as also maintaining a sustained push for development in targeted areas.