Iran’s Chessboard Strategy Against The US & Israel – Lessons for India

“If you wait by the river long enough, the bodies of your enemies will float by”

~ Sun Tzu
(Chinese General and strategist and author of ‘The Art of War’)

There is an apocryphal tale from the Indian epic poem, The Mahabharata that the United States and Israel could pay attention to as the war with Iran enters its fourth week. In the poem, the warrior Abhimanyu, the son of the great Pandava, Arjuna, learns about a military formation known as the ‘Chakravyuh’, while he is still in the womb. But as his mother doses off, the story goes, Abhimanyu hears the part about how to attack and enter the ‘Chakravyuh’ but misses the part about exiting it.

The lesson is simple. It may be easy to start a war, but it can get much harder to exit one, especially when the adversary is not ready to play ball.

If that sounds familiar to the current war in West Asia, then it is important to remember that warfare is more than technology, weapons and lethality. It is equally about history, economics, culture and above all, strategy. For India, that successfully executed ‘Operation Sindoor’ – a series of targeted attacks on Pakistan in the summer of 2025 as a response to a major terror attack earlier – the current war in West Asia will serve many pointers

Lessons On War from History

As the Iranian stranglehold over the Straits of Hormuz continues, it reveals how the Iranians executed a well-crafted strategy that managed to surprise President Donald Trump. While Indians invented chess, the Persians finessed and perfected it for centuries. Executing a well-crafted strategy, simple as it looks, has shown how far ahead the Iranians thought through their response against a vastly superior military coalition.

In 480 BC, a vastly superior Achaemenid Persian army numbering upwards of 120,000 with cavalry and naval units, under its king Xerxes I, invaded Greece. At the Pass of Thermopylae, a handful of Spartans, Thebans and Thespians numbering anywhere between 1000 to 1200 soldiers, held off this massive army for three crucial days. The delay is believed to have spared the rest of Greece as the Persian army returned to Asia, worried that they will get trapped due to the delay caused at Thermopylae.

If this seems familiar to the current state of affairs at the Straits of Hormuz, then clearly, the Iranians have learnt their lessons from history, The 12-day-war last year helped the Iranians learn from American and Israeli tactics (and strategy) to go after their launch pads and underground bunkers. It seems clear that those lessons turned into building resilient strike capabilities that included transporting missiles and munitions undetected and then launching them at targets across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as Israel.

But the Straits of Hormuz reveals another lesson from the long history of modern warfare. This lesson is from August 1964 in the Gulf Of Tonkin is an important one. Between August 2 and 4, North Vietnamese torpedo boats rammed into US Navy Destroyers, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy.

Incensed by the attack, President Lyndon B Johnson decided shepherded the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that authorised him to send more troops, ships and aircraft into battle in faraway Vietnam. While President Trump now seems to be hinting at a land invasion of Iran, the Tonkin incident offers valuable lessons for both sides.

For the Iranians this is an opportunity to surprise the Americans. They know that a land invasion will see American casualties escalating in a war that is getting unpopular in the US by the minute. A ground invasion will also mean a long engagement, that undermines President Trump’s promise for “no new wars”. Starting one will be a political defeat even before the Americans try to shape a military victory.  Their experience after 20 years in Afghanistan has now ended the American appetite for long wars. Rising costs of living has compounded it. For the Iranians, who remained out of globalization after decades of sanctions, did not feel the impact nearly as much as the Americans and the rest of the world are now feeling.

What makes the strategic confusion even more confounding is the shifting sand of “war aims” or conditions for “termination of conflict”. Gleaning from the utterances by the US leadership; “imminent threat” was followed by “regime change” to Iran posing an nuclear; we have seen the objectives change every day. While Israel has been deliberately opaque about its objectives, the destruction of Iranian nuclear program and significant degradation of Iranian missile and drone capabilities remain the key military objectives for them. Israel would also like this opportunity to degrade Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere – a war aim, that’s not aligned with US objectives.  In the muddle, are the ‘Red lines’ that are being drawn and redrawn every day. Energy infrastructure, power grids and desalination facilities keep coming on and off the target list. President Trump’s 48 hours-ultimatum to open the Straits of Hormuz was later extended by five days. From a strategic viewpoint, when red lines are uncertain, adversaries will be tempted to test them

Scorched Earth and the Inversion of Comprehensive National Power

Since the mid-1990s, Chinese scholars of strategy and warfare have espoused the theory of comprehensive national power (CNP). This means, when it comes to achieving strategic goals, a country must exercise its comprehensive national power – military, economic, cultural, diplomatic, technological – to shape the outcome. Inverse this theory and it offers insights into how the Iranians are planning their war.

Sensing serious disadvantage in terms of military might, technical edge, economic heft and diplomatic reach- Iran has sought to level the field by expanding it. They have decided to escalate the conflict vertically, horizontally and politically by utilizing asymmetric means.

By launching a multitude of drones and missiles at well defended military targets, inadequately defended infra targets and undefended civilian targets- Iran is exploiting the vertical domain reasonably well, despite not fielding any capable air force. Iran has triggered horizontal escalation by activating its ‘Axis of Resistance’ (a network of proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and Iraqi militias).

The targeting of GCC states, besides Iraq, Syria and Jordan in West Asia is a well-thought-out-strategy for horizontal escalation. Audacious strikes on Cyprus (and an alleged strike on Diego Garcia) are steps in that direction. Left to fend for themselves, the GCC countries were already under diplomatic and political strain. Iran exacerbated the political pressure by striking US assets in their territory; making it difficult for the regional (theocratic) monarchies to pick a side. The continued assistance to US-Israeli actions would invite Iranian retaliation; a counterattack on Iran (in aid of Israel) would be an extremely unpopular decision domestically. Disruptions to flow of traffic in the Straits of Hormuz is causing political reverberations far and wide, including in the USA.

Ironically, at this stage, President Trump would consider reopening the Straits of Hormuz as a ‘victory’. This is ironic because the Straits of Hormuz was open when the war began.

In 1832, the seminal work of Prussian army officer and military theorist Carl Philipp Gottlieb Clausewitz’s seminal work, ‘Vom Krieg (On War)’ was published posthumously by his wife. His work introduced the concept of the “centre of gravity (COG)” in modern warfare. He argued that the COG is the sum total of the primary source of strength and stability that a force needs to carry out its combat operations against. In the war in West Asia, the Americans and Israelis thought that the Iranian COG would be the Iranian military and the Regime.

They focused their war efforts on decapitation strikes and the degradation of the Iranian military potential, in the hope that regime would crumble and military would cease fighting. Some hope was also placed on a popular uprising in Iran. Those assumptions have turned out to be a strategic error so far.

The Iranians on the other hand (correctly) identified the American sensitivity to oil prices and disruptions to global supply chains as a key vulnerability as well as the COG. They also identified the lack of popular support amongst the regional countries currently in alliance with US and Israel. As some Israeli journalists have pointed out, their intelligence agencies are now convinced that the Iranians are convinced they are already victorious. Unless that belief changes, ending the war they started will not end on their terms.

What started as an economic battle of attrition expanded into a much larger strategy. Targeting cities known for economic success and stability has put the economy of the entire region under intense strain. The Iranians also expanded the targets beyond military ones – from data centres to banks and oil and gas production facilities, has upended the global supply chain like never before. While the Americans and Israelis seemed to have discounted the impact on global trade and supply chains, the Iranians immediately focused on the economic underpinnings of the war. The attack on Ras Laffan in Qatar has hit global LNG supplies that was never fully comprehended. While the financial damage is estimated to be upwards of $26 Billion, the immediate and mid-term impact on global supplies is much bigger.

This, in many ways, is the inverted “scorched earth” strategy in play. Spread the damage through carefully-planned strategic strikes, that it reshapes the world order. This has also given the Russians and the Chinese, enough room to flex diplomatic muscle, forcing the Americans to issue a general order allowing a temporary permission for the sale of crude and petroleum products from the Russian Federation. As the global economic damage spreads and countries scramble for a deepening energy crisis, the Iranians have created a new centre of gravity.

The Missile Economy Of Diminishing Returns – Frugality as a Sustainment Strategy

For a country that has been under sanctions since the early 1980s, the Iranians are no strangers to long wars. In the war against Iraq, the Iranians seemed to have gained an upper hand by 1983 but continued to fight doggedly until 1987.

Long drawn wars are all about sustainability. While the American military-industrial complex and Israeli know how is unmatched, the Iranians have lived through limited resources. This has now been inverted into their strategy. Iran has also leveraged her limited military capability by focusing on quantity rather than quality. Battlefield endurance replaces battlefield brilliance. Iran knows very well- they win; simply by not losing.

The Shahed drone is believed to cost $ 20000 to $50000 a piece. The missiles being used to intercept these drones are disproportionately more expensive. The options being a  Patriot PAC-3 costing $ 4 Million, the SM6 costing $ 6 Million and in some cases a THAAD missile costing $12 Million. Moreover, Iran has thousands of Shahed drones that can be built in underground bunkers. On the other hand, the rate of production of Patriot missiles is very low and there has been no new delivery of the THAAD missiles since August 2023. The US has been forced to relocate some its missile systems from Asia to West Asia, a step that was not very popular with the host countries.

The US also spent a large amount of expensive-high-end munitions in the early phases expecting a structural collapse cause by decapitating strikes. They are running low on high-end weapon systems and the concerns about magazine department can no longer be ignored. Drawing on various credible sources, the UK’s Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) estimated that 11,000 munitions were fired by the US-Israel coalition in the first 16 days of the assault on Iran. A report from the conservative US think tank, the Heritage Foundation has already warned that nation’s defence industrial base is at its lowest ebb currently. “Today, however, the United States cannot meet its own peacetime needs despite facing the most hostile threat environment it has seen since the Second World War, with adversaries that include Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea, Russia, Iran, and China,” the report said when it was published in April 2025.

Consider the case of Tomahawk missiles. US has fired over 800 of these at Iran with 170 being used in first 96 hours alone. In terms of carriage capacity, a US aircraft carrier has around 400 Tomahawks and an Ohio-class submarine, about 150.  At this rate of consumption, they are not left with many. To make matters worse, reports suggest that only 57 were produced this year. The math is brutal, suggesting unambiguously that staying in the fight longer is more important than being more lethal. Iranians have an edge there.

Analysts also point to another interesting statistic about Iranian launches versus successful strikes. On February 28, Iran launched around 500 ballistic missiles and 2000 drones – only 8% found the target. Others were intercepted or failed mid-flight. Incessant targeting of Iranian launchers, missile storage facility and deployed missile/drones was expected to bring a significant reduction in Iranian ability to launch their missiles and drones- and it did. In the succeeding days, Iranian launches fell by nearly 90%. However, on account of degraded ability of the defenders and better flight profiles of the drones, on March 10, out of the 35 drones launched by Iran, 25% found their target.

As the launch-to-hit ratio improves, Iran has whittled down expensive interception capabilities of her adversaries with cheap drones and is now achieving better targeting with its more sophisticated missiles. The attacks on Qatar’s Ras Laffan, Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahamadi refinery and Saudi Arabia’s SAMREF refinery took down major energy infrastructure. The Iranian strike on Dimona and Arad in Israel, close to its nuclear reactor, demonstrated the Iranian plan to shift from mass attrition to precise targeting. As cost of weapon systems and regenerative capacity of the military industrial complex comes into focus, the battle will be decided less by the quality and more by the quantity.

The removal of the biggest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R Ford is proof that the Iranian strategy is working. President Trump inadvertently admitted that the USS Ford was under attack “from 17 sides” forcing it to withdraw with a raging fire on its deck.

Till three weeks ago, no strategist  spoke about what is now labelled as Iran’s “mosaic doctrine”. Reports suggest that after surviving years of conflict, the Iranians began to prepare for decapitation strikes. This led to greater autonomy to their military commanders, ensuring remarkable resilience and second-strike capabilities. The US and Israel, obsessed with regime change, went after the well-known leaders. But their adversary had seen the whole chess board and outmaneuvered them with a strategy of its own.

Learning from borrowed experiences – Implications for India

Wars are about strategy. When engaged in a game of chess, the strategy emanates by looking at the entire board. Looking at it piecemeal rarely ends up in victory.

In most scenarios where India may be called on to defend its national strategic objectives, chances are that it will be fighting an asymmetric war, much like Iran. It has two nuclear-armed neighbours, a long history of being subjected to state-sponsored terrorism, entirely dependent for its energy security, has a vast land and maritime border to protect and has strategic Area of Responsibility (AOR) that stretches from the Malacca Straits to the Horn of Africa.

Wars need resilience, which needs careful planning. Higher defence planning in India has traditionally tended to be vertical, hierarchical and fragmented. A classic case is India’s military posture vis-à-vis, China. While it shares a long and contentious border with its northern neighbour, it has three army commands (Northern, Central and Eastern) that mans it, along with the IAF’s Eastern Air Command (EAC). Interestingly, the army and IAF’s Eastern Command are not even co-located, and integration, if any, rests more on paper than on ground.

If India were to develop its “mosaic doctrine” does the current structure work?

Does India have the underground tunnels and arsenal to build resilience into its second, third or fourth strike capabilities? India’s strategy is built (around) maintaining air superiority over its skies. However, as the war in West Asia has revealed, Iran’s skies have been left open to the Americans and the Israelis. It’s underground missile and drone arsenal is a different matter altogether.

Op Sindoor – A reset?

In early May 2025, responding to a major terror attack at Pahalgam, Kashmir, India carried out precise targeting of terror-infrastructure in Pakistan. The operation was termed as – Operation Sindoor. Pakistan responded with its own Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos. In its opening salvo, India chose precision at range, by demonstrating a calibrated strike capability while maintaining control of the escalatory ladder. Political directives required unleashing of limited violence, targeting only the terror-infra, avoiding all other   military targets. Contrary to conventional air power wisdom, air campaign was launched without the necessary Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) operations. The ensuing air-battle revealed to us the strengths and the shortcomings of Indian air power.

The limited conflict lasting barely 100 hours threw up many important lessons in relation to application of force in pursuit of national interests. Those lessons are being examined and would shortly reflect in our force structure, training, tactics and procedures. In addition, the Indian military and strategic community is also watching the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict unfolding in West Asia. The age-old adage, that the cheapest learning is when you learn from other’s mistakes is not lost. Specific to the US-Israel-Iran war, there are certain old lessons, that are being (re)learnt while certain new learnings are coming to the fore.

The PME at Indian Military training institutions at all levels cover an important subject called “Principles of War”. Derived from the writings of strategic thinkers like Sun Tzu, Chanakya, Machiavelli and Clausewitz – these principles are fundamental and enduring truths guiding military strategy. One of the first principles is ‘selection and maintenance of aim’. One must initiate armed conflict only when the politico-military objectives are clearly defined. Inherent in this principle are the ‘conditions of termination of conflict’. Prolonged conflict with no clear aim produces only losers, no winners.

In May 2025, India agreed to terminate hostilities when the objectives were achieved. US and also Russia to an extent are stuck in a prolonged conflict in Iran/Ukraine, with shifting war-aims and changing strategic objectives.

India controlled the escalation matrix during Op Sindoor by targeting the terror-infrastructure, military (tactical) targets, followed by military (strategic) targets. The game plan catered for off-ramp at each stage. In fact, Prime Minister Narendra Modi offered an off-ramp to Pakistan, immediately after the first wave of strikes. The bottom line is clear- off-ramps must be built in at each stage of the escalatory ladder.

The US-led air campaign has given a glimpse of the tremendous range, reach and targeting capabilities of the air power. At the same time, Iranian strategy has revealed the limits of air power. Niche platforms can ensure tactical success. However, the impact at operational and strategic levels are limited, unless one is willing to commit ground troops to exploit that success. Air superiority alone provides dwindling returns in absence of force application from other domains.

Quantity has a quality of its own. Technology is of limited use, unless it can be fielded at scale. Shahed (like) drones and proliferation of cheaper, dispersed surface launched missiles are causing a greater impact at operational and strategic levels. India’s force structures must reflect this newfound realisation. It is also clear that while moving targets at sea are harder to target, static targets like air fields will bear the brunt of the adversary’s arsenal. Indian planners have traditionally held a continental mindset, that has led to lesser resources to its maritime strategy, assets and deployment. This is especially true for second-strike deterrence in a nuclear scenario, including tactical (neutron) weapons being deployed. 

Developing A Comprehensive National Strategy

A significant amount of time is devoted to studying the enemy as a system – identifying strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and CoGs. The systems-approach tend to miss out on variables like morale, asymmetric capabilities, pain threshold, religious and ethnic sensibilities and so on. Iran is at a point where more bombs are not going to extract a change in behaviour. Similarly, India’s war plans must aim for compellence or deterrence rather than destruction alone.

Another important lesson that can be learnt from the ongoing wars is that India is critically dependent on energy imports and any disruptions of this supply chain has an immediate strategic impact on its war fighting capacities. Enemy action on battlefield can be sustained for months on end, however interruptions in hydrocarbon imports would have an immediate detrimental impact. Diversification of suppliers and creation of various strategic fuel reserves in India was a step towards mitigating this vulnerability. However, there is a realisation among Indian military and strategic planners that existing capabilities are not enough and more needs to be done on high priority. This need must take precedence over weapon systems.

In the sea domain, it has been seen that despite wielding disproportionately much stronger forces, both Russia and US find themselves at the receiving end. Threats from under-surface drones, autonomous boats and cheap aerial drones have made the Black sea fleet literally non-operational. The most modern aircraft carriers of the US Navy are hesitant to join the fight. Operating at a distance close to 1000 miles, even the air wing mounted on these boats is struggling to deliver effects. The vulnerability of capital assets, especially when operating close to shore, is not lost on anyone.

When the lessons impinge on turfs, sharp and often acerbic arguments are expected. The onus is on the strategic planners, policymakers and the politico-military leaders to draw relevant lessons and push through much-needed reforms overriding the institutional inertia.

As the people who invented chess, Indians need to appreciate that for a winning strategy, it is time to look at the entire board. A piecemeal approach is doomed for failure.